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Benefit or Burden?: 
Brackeen v. Zinke and the Constitutionality 
of the Indian Child Welfare Act 
KATIE L. GOJEVIC 
Officials seemingly would rather place Indian children in non-
Indian settings where their Indian culture, their Indian traditions 
and, in general, their entire Indian way of life is smothered . . . 
[Agencies] strike at the heart of Indian communities by literally 
stealing Indian children. This course can only weaken rather than 
strengthen the Indian child, the family, and the community . . . It 
has been called cultural genocide.1 
*** 
[T]his is the first time ever that a federal statute enacted to benefit 
Indians has been found to be unconstitutional on the grounds of 
equal protection . . . this is not just an effort to undermine ICWA, but 
to undermine all Indian law.2 
 
 1. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing Before the United States Senate 
Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 2 (1977) [hereinafter ICWA 
Hearing] (statement of James Abourezk, Senator, Chairman of the Committee). 
Congress passed ICWA the following year. 
 2. Dan Lewerenz, quoted in Meagan Flynn, Court Strikes Down Native 
American Adoption Law, Saying It Discriminates Against Non-Native Americans, 
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morn 
ing-mix/wp/2018/10/10/court-strikes-down-native-american-adoption-law-saying 
-it-discriminates-against-non-native-americans/?utm_term=.a032d27b3e41. 
Mr. Lewerenz was an attorney-advisor for the U.S. Department of the Interior, 
Office of the Solicitor, Division of Indian Affairs before becoming a staff attorney 
with the Native American Rights Fund. Dan Lewerenz, Staff Attorney, NARF, 
https://www.narf.org/profiles/dan-lewerenz/. 
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The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) governs the 
custody and adoption of Native American children as well as 
termination, both voluntary and involuntary, of Native 
American parental rights.3 Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 
as a response to the high number of Native American 
children who were removed from their homes and placed 
with white families and into institutions.4 In the Supreme 
Court’s 2013 decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the 
majority stated that an interpretation of ICWA that allowed 
a father who had not supported his child in utero to “play his 
ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to override the 
mother’s decision” to place that child for adoption would raise 
equal protection concerns.5 The Court held that ICWA did 
not apply to a Native American parent who had never had 
custody of the child in question.6 After this decision, various 
organizations, both those opposed to ICWA and those who 
argued against Native American sovereignty in general, 
began to file lawsuits arguing that ICWA as a whole was 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.7 Five years 
after Adoptive Couple, in Brackeen v. Zinke, one such lawsuit 
resulted in a Texas district court holding that parts of ICWA 
are unconstitutional.8 The court found that not only did parts 
of ICWA violate equal protection, but also that some of the 
challenged portions violate the Tenth Amendment’s “anti-
commandeering doctrine” and the Indian Commerce Clause.9 
 
 3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012). ICWA applies to all child custody cases 
that involve a child who is either a member of a Native American tribe or who is 
eligible for such membership. 
 4. About ICWA, NATIONAL INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASSOCIATION, https:// 
www.nicwa.org/about-icwa/. 
 5. 570 U.S. 637, 656 (2013). 
 6. Id. at 653–54. 
 7. Addie Rolnick & Kim Pearson, Racial Anxieties in Adoption: Reflections 
on Adoptive Couple, White Parenthood, and Constitutional Challenges to the 
ICWA, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 727, 750–54 (2017). 
 8. 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 546 (2018). 
 9. Id. at 541. 
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Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
Court at first issued a ruling overturning the district court’s 
decision10 on ICWA’s constitutionality, the Fifth Circuit 
granted rehearing en banc in November of 2019.11 
Part I of this Note discusses the reasoning behind 
Congress’ creation of ICWA and notable Supreme Court 
decisions dealing with this Act, as well as the Multiethnic 
Placement Act’s intersection with ICWA. Part II contains a 
detailed discussion of Brackeen. Part III contains an analysis 
of Brackeen, along with the foreseeable detrimental effects of 
this decision that extend beyond adoption cases. 
I. BACKGROUND OF ICWA AND NOTABLE CASES 
A. Native American Children Removal Prior to ICWA 
1. The Early Era 
Throughout the history of the United States, Native 
American children have been removed from their homes for 
the purposes of “education” and “civilization.”12 Beginning in 
the Colonial Era, these children were used as a way of 
controlling tribal behavior.13 As a part of warfare between 
the colonists and the Native Americans, the colonists often 
attacked tribes’ villages and “target[ed] children and their 
food source.”14 Native American children were also captured 
and used as hostages.15 During the Revolutionary War, 
Native American boys were sent to Dartmouth, supposedly 
to be educated but also to prevent their tribes from allying 
 
 10. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 441 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 11. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 33335 (5th Cir. Nov. 7, 
2019). 
 12. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Wenona T. Singel, Indian Children and the 
Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship, 95 NEB. L. REV. 885, 889 (2017); see also JOHN 
GRENIER, THE FIRST WAY OF WAR: AMERICAN WAR MAKING ON THE FRONTIER, 1607–
1814 (2005).  
 13. Fletcher & Singel, supra note 12, at 895.  
 14. Id. at 896. 
 15. Id. at 895.  
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with the British.16 Instead of “students,” these children were 
referred to as “hostages.”17 
After the American Revolution, Congress’ focus shifted 
to “civilizing” the Native Americans.18 The first attempts to 
accomplish this involved sending missionaries to various 
tribes.19 As part of their attempts to convert Native 
Americans to Christianity, missionaries and the religious 
organizations that funded them “sought to replace tribal 
culture, including Indian languages, with Christianity, 
Euro-American civilization, and the language of Euro-
 
 16. Id. at 911. For a further discussion of this event, see COLIN G. CALLOWAY, 
THE INDIAN HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN INSTITUTION: NATIVE AMERICANS AND 
DARTMOUTH (2010). The head of Dartmouth, Eleazar Wheelock, asked Congress 
to appoint $500 to the school for the education of Native American boys. See 
MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, INDIAN ORPHANAGES 87 (2001). Wheelock credited the fact 
that Dartmouth was never attacked during the Revolution to the presence of 
these “hostages.” Calloway, supra note 16, at 40–41. 
 17. Fletcher & Singel, supra note 12, at 911; see also Calloway, supra note 16, 
at 40–41.  
 18. See K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, THE UNNATURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
INDIAN EDUCATION, IN NEXT STEPS: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE TO ADVANCE 
AMERICAN INDIAN EDUCATION 1, 1–6 (Karen Gayton Swisher & John W. 
Tippeconnic III eds., 1999). 
 19. Letter from George Washington, President of the United States, to 
Benjamin Lincoln, Cyrus Griffin, and David Humphreys, Esq’rs (Aug. 29, 1789), 
reprinted in FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/05-03-02-0326. On the topic of Native Americans, Washington wrote: 
You will also endeavour [sic] to obtain a stipulation for certain 
missionaries to reside in the nation provided the General Government 
should think proper to adopt the measure—These Men to be precluded 
from trade or attempting to purchase any lands but to have a certain 
reasonable quantity pr [sic] head, allowed for the purpose of 
cultivation—The object of this establishment would be the happiness of 
the Indians, teaching them great duties of religion, and morality, and to 
inculcate a friendship and attachment to the united [sic] States. If after 
you have made your Communication to the Creeks and that you are 
persuaded that you are fully understood by them, they should refuse to 
treat and conclude a peace on the terms you propose, it may be concluded 
that they are decided on a continuance of acts of Hostility and that they 
ought to be gaurded [sic] against as the determined enemies of the 
United States. 
Id. 
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American society.”20 Because children adapted more easily to 
a new language, missionaries often focused on them, 
believing them to be the path to “civilizing” the tribes.21 
Missionaries taught Native American children to read and 
write while teaching them Christianity, partly to convey 
religious knowledge through the Bible and other religious 
texts but also to promote “civilization.”22 Some missionaries 
believed in using the Native Americans’ languages alongside 
English for the purposes of religious instruction.23 However, 
many “viewed [Native American languages] as barbarous 
and inadequate mediums for conveying Christian doctrines 
and as incompatible with efforts to foster the civilization of 
the Indians.”24 
2. Boarding Schools 
During the 1800s, the United States sharpened its focus 
on formal education as a means to “kill the Indian so as to 
save the man within.”25 In 1819, Congress created the 
“Civilization Fund” to provide money for schools to educate 
 
 20. Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with Words: Native Americans’ 
Continuing Struggle Against the Suppression of Their Languages, 60 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 901, 909 (1999). 
 21. See id. at 905–06, 908. 
 22. See id. at 906–08. 
 23. Jon Reyhner, Indigenous and Minority Languages Under Siege: Finding 
Answers to a Global Threat, 3 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151, 168 (2008) 
(stating that “Some missionaries strongly objected to not using Indian languages 
in their schools. Missionary societies engaged in foreign missions were very 
conscious of the importance of using local languages in their work.”). 
 24. Dussias, supra note 20, at 908. 
 25. Col. Richard Pratt, quoted in DAVID H. DEJONG, PROMISES OF THE PAST: A 
HISTORY OF INDIAN EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3–21 (1993). Pratt was the 
founder and first superintendent of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School in 
Pennsylvania, one of the oldest boarding schools created to educate and “civilize” 
Native Americans. See generally RICHARD H. PRATT, THE INDIAN INDUSTRIAL 
SCHOOL, CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA: ITS ORIGINS, PURPOSES, AND THE DIFFICULTIES 
SURMOUNTED (1908); see also RICHARD H. PRATT, DRASTIC FACTS ABOUT OUR 
INDIANS AND OUR INDIAN SYSTEM (1917); JACQUELINE FEAR-SEGAL & SUSAN D. 
ROSE, CARLISLE INDIAN INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL: INDIGENOUS HISTORIES, MEMORIES, 
AND RECLAMATIONS (2016). 
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Native Americans.26 A compulsory attendance law was 
passed in 1898; if parents refused to send their children to 
school, the government “[withheld] rations, clothing, and 
annuities.”27 Native children as young as four and five were 
removed from their parents and sent to boarding schools, 
where they were forbidden to speak their tribal languages 
and forced to speak English.28 Those who promoted these 
schools, most often religious groups,29 saw boarding schools 
as ideal because they believed that, in order to “civilize” 
Native children, they had to be taken away from the 
influence of their families and tribes.30 This view dominated 
Native education policy for the next seventy years.31 In 1928, 
a team headed by Lewis Meriam published a report on the 
conditions of Native Americans.32 This report was the result 
of studies done throughout the 1920s.33 The authors stated 
that although “the boarding school, either reservation or 
non-reservation, is the dominant characteristic of the school 
system maintained by the national government for its Indian 
wards . . . provisions for the care of the Indian children in 
boarding schools are grossly inadequate.”34 The report stated 
 
 26. GEORGE DEWEY HARMON, SIXTY YEARS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS: POLITICAL, 
ECONOMIC, AND DIPLOMATIC, 1789–1850 161 (1941). 
 27. Tabatha Toney Booth, Cheaper Than Bullets: American Indian Boarding 
Schools and Assimilation Policy, 1890–1930, available at https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20160404090314/http://www.se.edu/nas/files/2013/03/NAS-2009-proceeding 
s-Booth.pdf.  
 28. See Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History 
and the Nation’s Debt to the Indian Peoples, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 941, 
954 (1999). 
 29. Dussias, supra note 20, at 909. 
 30. Cross, supra note 28, at 952.  
 31. Id. at 960. 
 32. See generally LEWIS MERIAM ET AL., THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN 
ADMINISTRATION: REPORT OF A SURVEY MADE AT THE REQUEST OF HONORABLE 
HUBERT WORK, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, AND SUBMITTED TO HIM, FEBRUARY 21, 
1928 (1928), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED087573.pdf. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 11. 
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that these children were fed a “deficient” diet35 that 
contributed to the high occurrence of tuberculosis and 
trachoma in boarding school students.36 The report 
concluded that: 
[t]he most fundamental need in Indian education is a change in 
point of view. Whatever may have been the official governmental 
attitude, education for the Indian in the past has proceeded largely 
on the theory that it is necessary to remove the Indian child as far 
as possible from his home environment; whereas the modern point 
of view in education and social work lays stress on upbringing in 
the natural setting of home and family life.37 
After this point, enrollment in boarding schools declined, 
although the Great Depression caused a temporary rise in 
the number of new students due to many families’ economic 
conditions.38 
As the Meriam Report noted, boarding schools were often 
abusive environments that caused the suffering and even 
death of many students.39 This was true since their inception 
and remained so both throughout their heyday and as their 
popularity declined.40 Native American students suffered 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 12. At the Carlisle School, approximately 500 students died from 
disease throughout the school’s existence. PRESTON MCBRIDE, A BLUEPRINT FOR 
DEATH IN U.S. OFF-RESERVATION BOARDING SCHOOLS: RETHINKING INSTITUTIONAL 
MORTALITIES AT CARLISLE INDIAN INDUSTRIAL SCHOOl, 1879–1918 195 (2013). 
 37. MERIAM ET AL., supra note 32, at 346. 
 38. Booth, supra note 27, at 48. 
 39. See generally BOARDING SCHOOL BLUES: REVISITING AMERICAN INDIAN 
EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCES (Clifford E. Trafzer et al. ed., 2006).  
 40. See Andrea A. Curcio, Civil Claims for Uncivilized Acts: Filing Suit 
Against the Government for American Indian Boarding School Abuses, 
4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 45, 67 (2006). Negiel Bigpond, who attended the 
Chilocco Boarding School during the 1950s and 1960s, stated that: 
We were put into solitary confinement and punished. I can remember 
one night I had to defend myself from one of the counselors who was 
trying to provoke me and start trouble so he could give me hours of work 
duty or to make me stand all night in a corner or on top of a one-foot-by-
one-foot box with my nose to the wall. If we were caught sleeping, guards 
would walk up behind us and bang our heads into the wall. I received 
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both physical and sexual abuse.41 Many school employees 
were pedophiles who used their positions to prey upon 
vulnerable students without repercussions.42 Extreme 
corporal punishment was common; teachers and other 
disciplinarians beat students with whips, baseball bats, coat 
hangers, and rubber hoses.43 Some students died as a result 
of these beatings.44 Employees who abused students rarely 
received any consequences for their actions.45 
Students also suffered emotional and psychological 
abuse at boarding schools.46 School employees were 
instructed “not to comfort and counsel [them].”47 Students 
were forced to speak only English and were punished for 
speaking their native languages.48 Through this process, 
 
many bloody noses and cuts on my forehead. We were also made to scrub 
floors and walls with small hand brushes and even toothbrushes. 
The emotional and mental abuse was very bad. We were made to feel 
that we were nothing. We were called “dogs” and “stupid” and “Indian” 
in an angry, degrading and mocking voice. There was sexual abuse as 
well that I would rather not talk about. I choose not to go into the details 
of all that happened there. When released and I returned home I would 
cry a lot. I developed resentments toward my parents and turned against 
authority. I could not trust authority. I could not adapt to public school.  
Apology to Native Peoples: Hearing on S.J. Res. 15, Before S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 112th Cong. (2005) (statement of Negiel Bigpond, Sr., President, Two 
Rivers Native American Training Center). 
 41. Curcio, supra note 40, at 67; see also Sarah Deer, Relocation Revisited: Sex 
Trafficking of Native Women in the United States, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 621, 
666 (2010). 
 42. Curcio, supra note 40, at 67. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
 45. See id. at 69. 
 46. Id. at 72 (stating that “[a]ttendees’ symptoms often mirror those suffered 
by concentration camp survivors or survivors of child abuse, domestic violence, 
rape, and hostage situations”). 
 47. Curcio, supra note 40, at 70. 
 48. Dussias, supra note 20, at 926. One teacher stated that she “once had 
thirty-five Mohave kindergartners lie ‘like little sardines’ across tables, and then 
spanked them for speaking Mohave.” Id. (quoting DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, 
EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL 
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some children began to associate their native languages with 
fear.49 In addition, children who adapted to speaking only 
English found it difficult to communicate with their parents 
and relatives once they returned home.50 
Successive generations suffered the effects of their 
ancestors’ boarding school upbringings.51 Being raised 
outside a family environment in an oftentimes abusive 
situation meant that parents lacked the examples to 
properly raise their own children.52 Lynn Eagle Feather’s 
great-great-grandfather was the first member of her family 
to attend a boarding school; many of his descendants also 
attended such schools.53 Lynn’s mother, who had also been 
raised in a boarding school, dropped Lynn and her younger 
sister off at the Saint Francis Mission School in North 
 
EXPERIENCE, 1875–1928 141 (1995)). One school that allowed dual instruction in 
English and Dakota received the following directive:  
[T]he English language only must be taught the Indian youth placed 
there for educational and industrial training at the expense of the 
Government. If Dakota or any other language is taught such children, 
they will be taken away and their support by the Government will be 
withdrawn from the school. 
J.D.C. Atkins, The English Language in Indian Schools, in AMERICANIZING THE 
AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE “FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN,” 1880–1900 199 
(Francis Paul Prucha, ed., 1973). 
 49. Dussias, supra note 20, at 928. At the Carlisle school, one student spoke 
a word of her native Sioux and became “so upset that she could not eat her dinner 
and wept at the dining table.” Id. 
 50. See id. One former student reported that he could barely form a full 
sentence in his native Pawneean. Id.  
 51. Ann Murray Haag, The Indian Boarding School Era and Its Continuing 
Impact on Tribal Families and the Provision of Government Services, 43 TULSA L. 
REV. 149, 158 (2007). 
 52. Id. at 159. Ida Amiotte, who had attended a boarding school, stated, “My 
children always asked me ‘Why are you so cold? Why don’t you hug us?’ I said ‘I 
never learned how.’” Id. at n.91. 
 53. Cecily Hilleary, Indian Boarding Schools: One Woman’s Tragic, 
Triumphant Story, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.voa 
news.com/a/indian-boarding-schools-a-family-affair/4078971.html. Lynn’s great-
great-grandfather, Felix Eagle Feather, was sent 1400 miles away from his tribal 
home to the Carlisle School in Pennsylvania. Id. 
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Dakota when Lynn was six years old.54 Her sister was five.55 
Lynn states: “I was abused for years, most of my life. That’s 
why I didn’t ever get married. I chose to be on my own. When 
I did have children, I didn’t know how to raise them. I lost 
my children to the Department of Human Services.”56 
3. Adoption 
Following the decline of boarding schools came a new 
reason to remove Native American children from their 
homes: adoption.57 The Indian Adoption Project lasted from 
1959 to 1967 and was the product of cooperation between 
three agencies.58 Two (the United States Children’s Bureau 
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs) were federal agencies, 
while the third was a “a federated agency known as the Child 
Welfare League of America.”59 These agencies collaborated to 
“remov[e] administrative and racial barriers”60 in order to 
place Native American children into white adoptive 
families.61 Newspaper articles and television spots labeled 
 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. Lynn’s son, Paul Castaway, was shot by the police in Denver, Colorado, 
in 2015. Id. Lynn had called the police when Paul, whom she had a protective 
order against, entered her apartment and threatened her with a knife. Noelle 
Phillips, Denver DA Will Not Charge Officer Who Shot, Killed Paul Castaway, 
DENVER POST (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/09/14/denver-
da-will-not-charge-officer-who-shot-killed-paul-castaway/. No charges were filed 
against the police officer. Id. 
 56. Hilleary, supra note 53. 
 57. Claire Palmiste, From the Indian Adoption Project to the Indian Child 
Welfare Act: the Resistance of Native American Communities, 12 INDIGENOUS 
POL’Y J., no.1, at 1 (2011); see also Gabby Deutch, A Court Battle Over a Dallas 
Toddler Could Decide the Future of Native American Law, ATLANTIC (Feb. 21, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/02/indian-child-welfare-
acts-uncertain-future/582628/. 
 58. Palmiste, supra note 57, at 1.  
 59. Id. The Child Welfare League of America’s main role in the partnership 
was to “remov[e] legal barriers for interstate adoptions [and] solv[e] conflicts in 
adoption laws and practices.” Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. In the preceding decades, adoption agencies had focused on creating 
“cultural, religious and physical match[es]” between potential adoptive families 
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Native American babies as “God forgotten [c]hildren” who 
were doomed to languish in neglect on reservations unless 
white couples stepped up and adopted them.62 
During the project’s eight-year span, approximately 400 
Native American children were adopted by white families.63 
During the 1960s, other agencies took on a similar emphasis 
on Native American adoption, resulting in white couples 
adopting over 12,000 Native American children by the mid-
1970s.64 Follow-up studies on these children revealed that, 
although they usually did well during infancy and early 
childhood, “once they [reached] adolescence, runaway 
problems, suicide attempts, drug usage, and truancy [were] 
extremely common among them, even though they [were] 
raised away from the reservation and away from Indian 
society . . . during adolescence, [the teenagers] found that 
society was not to grant them the white identity that they 
had.”65 
B. Creation of ICWA 
The Indian Child Welfare Act was the result of a 
Congressional investigation that took place over four years.66 
This investigation revealed that between 25 to 35% of Native 
American children were removed from their families and 
 
and babies. Id. at 1 n.1. However, during the 1950s, the number of white babies 
available for adoption declined due to “wide use of contraceptive materials 
amongst white women, the possibility of abortion in some states, and a fading 
stigma towards unwed mothers.” Id. at 2. Thus, with white families being the 
majority of couples seeking adoption, agencies began to abandon their previous 
“matching” tactics and promote interracial adoption. See id. at 2–3. The first 
widely publicized transracial adoptions of the 1950s were international adoptions 
from Korea. Id. at 2.  
 62. Id. at 2–3. 
 63. Id. at 5. 
 64. Id. at 5–6. 
 65. Id. at 6 (quoting Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, a “psychiatrist who worked 
with Native patients”). 
 66. Kasey D. Ogle, Why Try to Change Me Now?: The Basis for the 2016 Indian 
Child Welfare Act Regulations, 96 NEB. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (2017). 
258 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
placed in foster care or institutions such as orphanages and 
the remaining boarding schools.67 Oftentimes, the only 
rationalization behind these removals was that these 
children would be better off in a home with white parents of 
a higher socioeconomic status.68 In order to address this 
“cultural genocide,”69 Congress passed ICWA in 1978.70 This 
Act gave jurisdiction of all custody proceedings involving 
“Indian children” to tribal courts.71 ICWA defined “Indian 
child” as a child who is either a member of a federally 
recognized tribe or eligible to be a member of such a tribe and 
have a biological parent who is a tribal member.72 Native 
American parents were no longer required to send their 
children to boarding school and required that investigations 
begin to determine the “feasibility” of establishing “locally 
convenient day schools” on reservations.73 ICWA also 
required that involuntary termination of Native American 
parents’ rights be based on evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt74 as opposed to the “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard traditionally used in such proceedings.75 ICWA 
further stated that: 
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a 
preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the 
contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended 
 
 67. ICWA Hearing, supra note 1, at 1.  
 68. Id.; see also infra Section III.B. 
 69. ICWA Hearing, supra note 1, at 2; see also Andrea Wilkins, State-Tribal 
Cooperation and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 1 (July 2008), https:// 
www.ncsl.org/print/statetribe/ICWABrief08.pdf. 
 70. 25 U.S.C. § 1901. 
 71. Id. at § 1911.  
 72. Id. at § 1903(4). 
 73. Id. at § 1961.  
 74. Id. at § 1912. 
 75. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-314, WIS. STAT. § 48.415 (2017–2018). 
In contrast to beyond a reasonable doubt, preponderance of the evidence is often 
defined as “more probable than not.” See Charlene Sabini, Burden of Proof: An 
Essay of Definition, NALS (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.nals.org/blogpost/ 
1359892/300369/Burden-of-Proof-An-Essay-of-Definition.  
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family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other 
Indian families.76 
C. Post-ICWA 
The first Supreme Court case regarding ICWA, 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, was 
decided in 1989.77 In Holyfield, two Native parents domiciled 
on a Choctaw reservation made an adoption plan for their 
unborn twins.78 Before giving birth, the mother moved off the 
reservation.79 The twins were placed with a white couple and 
later adopted.80 The Supreme Court held that the twins were 
under the jurisdiction of ICWA because both of their parents 
were domiciled on the Choctaw reservation, regardless of 
where the twins were actually born.81 Once the case was 
removed to the tribal court, that court allowed the twins to 
remain with the Holyfields for adoption, stating that 
removing them after nearly five years would be “cruel.”82 
Similar concerns of “cultural genocide” were raised about 
a different race of children around the same time Congress 
passed ICWA. During the 1960s, white families began 
adopting increasing numbers of black children.83 The 
National Association of Black Social Workers expressed 
doubt that white parents could adequately parent black 
children in a culturally competent way.84 However, other 
 
 76. 25 U.S.C. § 1915.  
 77. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
 78. Id. at 37.  
 79. See id.  
 80. Id. at 30, 38. 
 81. Id. at 48–49. 
 82. Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 
17 (2008). 
 83. Id. at 33. See also supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 84. National Association of Black Social Workers, Position Statement on 
Trans-Racial Adoption (1972), https://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/archive/ 
NabswTRA.htm. 
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child welfare organizations raised concerns about the large 
number of black children remaining in foster care for years 
awaiting adoptive families.85 
In response to this, Congress passed the Multiethnic 
Placement Act (MEPA) in 1994 and amended it in 1996.86 
MEPA applied to all agencies that placed children into 
adoptive homes and received federal funding.87 The original 
Act allowed adoption agencies to weigh race and culture as 
factors when determining the placement of a child.88 
However, some agencies continued to use race as the most 
important factor when placing children for adoption instead 
of as just one factor to be considered. As a response to this, 
the 1996 amendments to the MEPA removed these 
considerations and prohibited race-based placements.89 
However, the amended MEPA allowed for an exception to 
conform with ICWA, stating that agencies: 
[may not] delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into 
foster care, on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the 
adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved . . . This subsection 
shall not be construed to affect the application of the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978.90 
The most recent wave of court cases dealing with ICWA 
 
 85. Id. Black children, along with Native American children, were considered 
“hard to place” along with children who were “developmentally delayed and 
physically disabled.” Fostering and Foster Care, THE ADOPTION HISTORY PROJECT 
(last updated Feb. 24, 2012), https://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/topics/fostering 
.htm. 
 86. Maldonado, supra note 82, at 33–34. 
 87. Id.  
 88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5115(a) (repealed 1996). 
 89. Id. 
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 1996(b). MEPA was passed partially in reaction to groups that 
lobbied for legislation similar to ICWA that would apply to black children. See 
Douglas R. Esten, Transracial Adoption and the Multiethnic Placement Act of 
1994, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1941, 1948–49 (1995). Support for such a law still exists. 
See generally Jessica Dixon, The African-American Child Welfare Act: A Legal 
Redress for African-American Disproportionality in Child Protection Cases, 
10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 109 (2008). 
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can be traced back to the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (also known as the Baby 
Veronica case).91 In this case, an unmarried father, Dusten 
Brown, agreed to give up his parental rights and proceeded 
to place the child with a white couple, Matt and Melanie 
Capobianco, for the purpose of adoption.92 Because Christina 
Maldanado, the child’s mother, identified the baby’s father 
as being part Cherokee, her lawyer notified the tribe of the 
pending adoption, although Brown’s first name and date of 
birth were incorrect.93 The Capobiancos supported 
Maldanado for the remainder of her pregnancy; Brown did 
not provide assistance to Maldanado since she refused to 
marry him after discovering that she was pregnant.94 Brown 
also signed a document giving up his parental rights four 
months after the child’s birth, although he stated during 
later testimony that he was not aware he was doing so for 
the purposes of adoption.95 Shortly afterwards, Brown 
requested a stay of the adoption.96 After two years of legal 
proceedings, the child (“Baby Veronica”) was placed into 
Brown’s custody by the South Carolina Supreme Court.97 
The court held that Baby Veronica was subject to ICWA due 
to her father being an enrolled member of the Cherokee 
Nation.98 Therefore, in order to terminate Brown’s rights, the 
Capobiancos would have had to show that “custody of 
[Veronica] would result in serious emotional or physical 
harm to her beyond a reasonable doubt.”99 Because they 
 
 91. Jane Burke, The “Baby Veronica” Case: Current Implementation Problems 
of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 307, 307 (2014). 
 92. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 643 (2013). 
 93. Id. at 643–44. 
 94. Id. at 644.  
 95. Id. at 644–45. 
 96. Id. at 645. 
 97. Id. at 645.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 646. 
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failed to do so, Brown received custody of the child.100 The 
Capobiancos appealed, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.101 
The majority held that, because Brown had never been a 
custodial parent, ICWA did not apply, as this statute had 
been intended to protect the “continued custody” of Native 
American parents.102 Because of this holding, the 
Capobiancos were able to adopt Veronica, as under the 
applicable state statutes Brown’s parental rights could be 
involuntarily terminated for not providing support to 
Maldanado during her pregnancy.103 In its decision, the 
majority stated that a reading of ICWA that allowed an 
absentee father to “play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh 
hour”104 and prevent the mother from giving the child up for 
adoption would raise equal protection concerns, as this would 
cause many hopeful adoptive parents to hesitate to accept 
placements of children who had remote Native heritage.105 
The majority also held that ICWA’s placement preferences 
did not apply when “no alternative party has formally sought 
to adopt the child.”106 
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor stated that, contrary 
to what the majority claimed, classifying a case as ICWA-
applicable based on blood descent does not raise equal 
protection concerns.107 Rather, the Supreme Court had 
previously held that such a classification was political as 
opposed to “impermissibl[y] racial.”108 Therefore, Sotomayor 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 653–54. 
 103. Id. at 646–47. 
 104. Id. at 656. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 655. No paternal relatives of Veronica’s, nor any member of the 
Cherokee tribe, had filed a petition to adopt her. Id. at 655–56. 
 107. Id. at 690. 
 108. Id. 
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stated that the majority’s “hint[ing] at lurking constitutional 
problems [that are] irrelevant” only “[created] a lingering 
mood of disapprobation of the criteria for [tribal] 
membership.”109 
After the decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, later 
cases seized upon the equal protection language in that case 
and filed suit on these constitutional grounds. Many of these 
cases were filed by the Goldwater Institute, a nonprofit 
group.110 One of the Goldwater Institute’s stated missions is 
to “ensur[e] equal protection for Native American children” 
by “challenging the Indian Child Welfare Act.”111 
Courts have dismissed many of these recent cases 
challenging ICWA for lack of standing.112 In one such case, 
National Council for Adoption v. Jewell, the court denied the 
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.113 The court held 
that the plaintiff, an adoption agency, failed to show “a 
cognizable injury in fact” and a “causal connection” between 
such an injury and ICWA.114 
Another case, A.D. v. Washburn, challenged ICWA by 
alleging that it was “unconstitutional racial 
discrimination.”115 The plaintiffs, several foster parents and 
adoptive couples and their respective foster and adoptive 
 
 109. Id. at 691. 
 110. See Ensuring Equal Protection for Native American Children, GOLDWATER 
INSTITUTE, https://goldwaterinstitute.org/indian-child-welfare-act/ (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2019). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Scott Trowbridge, Legal Challenges to ICWA: An Analysis of Current Case 
Law, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/child_law_practice/vol-36/ 
january-2017/legal-challenges-to-icwa—an-analysis-of-current-case-law/. 
 113. 156 F. Supp. 3d 727, 738 (E.D. Va. 2015). The plaintiff, National Council 
for Adoption, Building Arizona Families, filed suit on behalf of itself and its 
clients, birthparents who sought to give up their infant “T.W.” for adoption. 
 114. Id. at 735. 
 115. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38060 at *4 (D. Ariz., Mar. 16, 2017). 
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children,116 argued that portions of ICWA violated both the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Constitution.117 The court held that, as in National Adoption 
Council v. Jewell, the plaintiffs lacked standing because they 
failed to show the existence of an injury and a causal 
connection between that injury and ICWA.118 
Despite the fact that the continued constitutional 
challenges to ICWA were not successful, some jurisdictions 
failed to adhere to it. In 2015, the Oglala and Rosebud Sioux 
tribes brought a suit against several individuals in the child 
welfare field alleging that they violated ICWA when 
removing Native American children from their homes 
“during state court 48-hour hearings.” 119 The defendants 
included the Honorable Jeff Davis, the presiding judge of the 
Seventh Judicial Circuit in South Dakota; Mark Vargo, the 
State’s Attorney of Pennington County, South Dakota; Lynne 
Valenti, the Secretary of the South Dakota Department of 
Social Services; and LuAnn Van Hunnik, who was in charge 
of Pennington County’s Child Protection Services.120 
The South Dakota district court found that the 
defendants had violated both ICWA121 and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.122 ICWA requires 
that anyone seeking to place a Native American child into 
foster care must show “that active efforts have been. [sic] 
made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative 
programs . . . and that these efforts have proved 
unsuccessful.”123 If such a showing is not made, the person 
 
 116. Id. at *9. 
 117. Id. at *10. 
 118. Id. at *33–34. 
 119. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749, 755–56 (D.S.D. 
2015). 
 120. Id. at 753. 
 121. Id. at 769. 
 122. Id. at 772. 
 123. Id. at 755 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d)). 
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seeking foster care placement must show by “clear and 
convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified expert 
witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the 
parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child.”124 The court 
found that the defendants had not followed either provision 
at hearings which took place forty-eight hours after a child’s 
temporary placement into foster care.125 In addition, Judge 
Davis did not allow Native American parents to present 
evidence at these hearings126 and the defendants as a whole 
often did not inform parents why their children were placed 
into foster care.127 
In 2016, in response to states’ lenient adherence to 
ICWA, the Bureau of Indian Affairs released new ICWA 
guidelines.128 These guidelines clarified key portions of 
ICWA, such as the definitions of “Indian child” and “extended 
family.”129 The most significant change was the guidelines’ 
explanation of the “good cause” clause of ICWA. From 1978 
to 2016, it had been left to the courts in each individual case 
to decide what “good cause” meant.130 The “Final Rule” 
placed the burden of proof on the non-Native party seeking 
to adopt.131 It also stated that courts should not compare the 
financial situations of Native and non-Native families.132 
This led to the case that is the subject of this Note. 
  
 
 124. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)). 
 125. Id. at 765. 
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 130. Flynn, supra note 2.  
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II. BRACKEEN V. ZINKE 
The case involved seven individual plaintiffs: Chad and 
Jennifer Brackeen, Nick and Heather Libretti, Altagracia 
Socorro Hernandez, and Jason and Danielle Clifford.133 
Three states (Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana) also joined the 
case.134 A.L.M., the child,  was placed with the Brackeens as 
a foster care placement at the age of ten months.135 His 
parents were both enrolled members of Native tribes (Navajo 
and Cherokee).136 After sixteen months, the Brackeens, with 
the approval of A.L.M.’s parents, began the process of 
adopting him137 after the state of Texas terminated the 
biological parents’ rights.138 The Navajo Nation found a 
potential adoptive placement in New Mexico that was not 
biologically related to A.L.M.139 The Brackeens argued that 
there was good cause for A.L.M. to remain in their home and 
be adopted by them, as he had lived with them for over a year 
and was not acquainted with the prospective adoptive 
resource in New Mexico.140 They further contended that by 
moving out of Texas, A.L.M. would lose contact with his 
biological family, including his parents and grandmother.141 
Under the Final Rule, evidence of good cause must be “clear 
and convincing” and the non-Native party seeking adoption 
bears the burden of proof.142 The Texas Department of 
Family Services stated that the Brackeens had not met this 
 
 133. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 519 (N.D. Tex. 2018), rev’d sub 
nom. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019). 
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burden of proof.143 Despite this, the Brackeens were allowed 
to petition the court for adoption of A.L.M. in January of 
2018; however, they stated that they wished to foster and 
adopt more children in the future, but will now hesitate to 
consider children of Native American descent.144 
Altagracia Socorro Hernandez placed her child, “Baby 
O.,” with the Librettis for the purpose of adoption.145 
Although the baby’s father is descended from members of the 
Pueblo Tribe, he is not himself a member.146 The Pueblo 
Tribe intervened in the custody proceedings regarding Baby 
O. and attempted to move her to a different placement.147 
Once the Librettis joined the instant case, the Pueblo Tribe 
allowed them to petition for Baby O.’s adoption; however, like 
the Brackeens, the Librettis state that they too wish to adopt 
children in the future and will be cautious about pursuing 
the adoption of any Native American child.148 
“Child P.” was placed with the Cliffords as a foster 
placement.149 While Child P. is not a registered member of a 
Native tribe, her grandmother is a member of the White 
Earth Ojibwe band.150 As a result of the placement 
preferences outlined in ICWA, Child P. was removed from 
the Cliffords’ home and placed with her grandmother, who 
had previously lost her license to provide foster care.151 
In a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued 
that ICWA violates both the Equal Protection and Due 
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Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment,152 the Tenth 
Amendment,153 and the “proper scope” of the Indian 
Commerce Clause.154 Additionally, the state plaintiffs 
argued that ICWA “usurps” state authority over child 
custody and welfare proceedings and also burdens state 
governments with the cost of complying with ICWA.155 
The defendants consisted of the Cherokee, Navajo, and 
Oneida Nations, as well as the Secretary of the United States 
Department of the Interior and the Director of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs.156 They contended that prior Supreme Court 
decisions had determined that classification based on Native 
American ancestry was political, not racial, and thus ICWA 
should not be subject to strict scrutiny.157 
The Texas district court granted summary judgment on 
the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.158 In its holding, the 
court found that the classifications made by ICWA were 
based on race, as ICWA applies not only to children who are 
members of a federally recognized tribe, but children who are 
eligible for such membership.159 Thus, the court held that 
ICWA was subject to strict scrutiny.160 Once the court 
applied this standard, it found that ICWA failed to survive 
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 155. See id. at 529–30. 
 156. Id. at 519–20. 
 157. Id. at 531. 
 158. Id. at 536. See generally Timothy Sandefur, Escaping the ICWA Penalty 
Box: In Defense of Equal Protection for Indian Children, 37 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. 
J. 1, 24 (2017) (noting the plaintiffs in Brackeen were not the first to challenge 
the ICWA on equal protection grounds. Proponents of this view argued that 
ICWA deprived Native American children of equal protection because “in an 
ICWA case, the most crucial factor—virtually the deciding factor—is the child’s 
biologically determined Indian status . . . because [this] result[s] in treating them 
differently than other children due exclusively to their racial or national origin, 
[ICWA] also deprive[s] Indian children of the equal protection of the law”). 
 159. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 534–35. 
 160. Id. at 534. 
2020] BENEFIT OR BURDEN? 269 
strict scrutiny because it was not “narrowly tailored to a 
compelling [governmental] interest.”161 The court stated that 
ICWA was “overinclusive”162 because this Act “establishes 
standards that are unrelated to specific tribal interests and 
applies those standards to potential Indian children,” 
thereby affecting not only children who were tribal members, 
but those who could possibly enroll.163 
The court also granted the plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment on their claims that ICWA violates the 
Tenth Amendment.164 In doing so, the court relied heavily on 
the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Murphy v. NCAA, in 
which the Court held that “[the Constitution] confers upon 
Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.”165 
The Texas court stated that ICWA “requires states to adopt 
and administer comprehensive federal standards in state 
created causes of action” and thus regulates those states.166 
Furthermore, because of this, the court found that ICWA 
extended beyond the scope of the Indian Commerce Clause 
and thus granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment on that ground. 167 
The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment on their due process claim, stating that the 
Supreme Court had never “applied [due process] rights in a 
situation involving either prospective adoptive parents or 
adoptive parents whose adoption is open to collateral 
attack.”168 The defendants appealed the Texas court’s 
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decision to the Fifth Circuit.169 In December of 2018, the 
Fifth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal.170 
The Fifth Circuit issued a decision on August 9, 2019.171 
The appellate court held that the district court had erred in 
its ruling and that ICWA did not violate the Constitution. 
The court determined that ICWA was “based on a political 
classification that is rationally related to the fulfillment of 
Congress’s unique obligation toward Indians.”172 The Fifth 
Circuit panel also held that “ICWA preempts conflicting 
state laws” and “does not violate the Tenth Amendment 
anticommandeering doctrine.”173 On November 7, 2019, the 
Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc.174 
III. ANALYSIS AND IMPACT 
A. Analysis of Brackeen Decision 
The court in Brackeen came to an erroneous decision 
when it determined that ICWA’s placement preferences 
violated the Equal Protection Clause, and the Fifth Circuit 
should come to the same conclusion in its rehearing en banc 
as it did in its panel decision. Had the district court applied 
the correct standard of judicial review, rational basis review, 
instead of strict scrutiny, it could not have arrived at the 
same conclusion. Courts apply strict scrutiny “when the 
government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of 
individual racial classifications.”175 In its decision, the 
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Brackeen court distinguished between laws targeting Native 
Americans by “racial classifications”176 as opposed to those 
that create “political classifications” and found that ICWA 
made the former type.177 To illustrate this difference, the 
court contrasted the holding of the Supreme Court in Rice v. 
Cayetano with that in Morton v. Mancari.178 
At issue in Rice v. Cayetano was a Hawaii statute 
limiting what persons could vote in an election for trustees 
of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA).179 This office 
oversaw programs which were designed to benefit 
“Hawaiians.”180 Hawaiians, as defined by the statute at 
issue, were not the general inhabitants of that state but 
rather “those persons who are descendants of people 
inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778.”181 Only those who 
qualified as Hawaiian under this definition could vote in the 
election for the OHA trustee positions.182 The State argued 
that the statute was not racially based but rather created 
classifications based on “whose ancestors were in Hawaii at 
a particular time, regardless of their race.”183 The Court did 
not find the State’s argument persuasive, stating that the 
statute in question “used ancestry as a racial definition and 
for a racial purpose,”184 and that an “ancestral inquiry” was 
“not consistent with respect . . . the Constitution itself 
secures in its concern for persons and citizens.”185 The Court 
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held that the “demeaning premise that citizens of a 
particular race are somehow more qualified than others to 
vote on certain matters . . . attacks the central meaning of 
the Fifteenth Amendment.”186 
In contrast, in Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court 
held that a hiring preference for Native Americans was a 
political classification and therefore permissible.187 At issue 
in Mancari was a portion of the Indian Reorganization Act 
that gave Native Americans hiring preferences for positions 
at the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).188 Non-Native 
employees argued that this preference was impermissible 
because it denied them “equal employment opportunity.”189 
In holding that the classification was political as opposed to 
racial, the Court pointed to a long series of cases throughout 
the United States’ history that “single[d] out Indians for 
particular and special treatment.”190 The Court stated this 
“special treatment” was allowable so long as it was rationally 
related to the “fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation 
towards the Indians.”191 
Here, the classification made by ICWA is like that in 
Mancari rather than Rice. ICWA applies to children who are 
members of a federally recognized tribe, as well as those 
eligible for such membership who have at least one parent 
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that is already a member.192 Under Mancari, if a statute 
creates a classification based on membership in a federally 
recognized tribe, this classification is political, not racial.193 
Therefore, ICWA’s first classification is clearly permissible. 
ICWA’s second classification that depends on eligibility and 
parentage is not an objectionable “ancestral inquiry” such as 
in Rice.194 Rather, its purpose is to extend the political 
classification to Native American children who would most 
benefit from it. Membership in a federally recognized tribe is 
“not conferred automatically upon birth . . . Instead, an 
eligible child [or parents] must take affirmative steps to 
enroll the child.”195 If ICWA did not include this second 
classification, many children whose parents did not yet have 
the opportunity to register them as tribal members would 
lose the statute’s protections.196 Furthermore, other statutes 
make political classifications based on parentage. For 
example, children born abroad of U.S. citizens inherit their 
parents’ citizenship.197 Therefore, the Brackeen court 
incorrectly applied strict scrutiny. 
When applying rational basis review, there is no 
question that ICWA’s placement preferences are rationally 
related to Congress’ “unique obligation” toward Native 
Americans.198 Native American children have a long history 
of being forcibly removed from their homes, families, and 
culture.199 ICWA was designed to prevent these children 
from being needlessly removed from their homes. Should 
removal be necessary, ICWA greatly increases the chances 
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that these children are placed within their culture in order 
to maintain it.200 
B. Impact 
For these reasons, this author believes that the Fifth 
Circuit will issue the same ruling on rehearing en banc as it 
did in its panel decision. However, there is a possibility, 
however remote, that the Fifth Circuit en banc will instead 
affirm the lower court. Such a decision would have multiple 
negative effects. Although the decision would only be binding 
on the Fifth Circuit, it would create a persuasive precedent 
for other circuits to follow. 
The most obvious consequence of the appellate court 
affirming the ruling in Brackeen is the effect on adoption. If 
ICWA is declared unconstitutional, the termination of the 
parental rights (TPR) of Native Americans would be based 
on a preponderance evidentiary standard as opposed to 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This lowering of the evidentiary 
standard would make it easier for child welfare workers who 
are unfamiliar with Native culture to argue that parental 
rights should be terminated. Officially, poverty alone is not 
permitted to provide the basis for TPR; however, in practice, 
it often does.201 This would put Native American parents at 
an even greater risk of losing their parental rights; Native 
Americans experience poverty at nearly twice the national 
average.202 This would also put relatives seeking placement 
of a child at risk. Non-ICWA child welfare proceedings are 
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UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.census.gov/content/ 
dam/Census/newsroom/facts-for-features/2017/cb17-ff20.pdf. (stating that while 
the national average of U.S. residents living below the poverty line was 14%, 
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guided by the “best interest of the child.”203 This would 
increase the risk of Native American children being placed 
with white couples of a higher socioeconomic class instead of 
relatives who could provide a vital link to their culture but 
who fall into a lower income bracket. 
The plaintiffs in a recent Texas case, In the Interest of 
A.M., relied upon the holding in Brackeen to argue this 
changed evidentiary standard.204 In A.M., the biological 
mother of a three-year-old boy appealed the termination of 
her parental rights, alleging ICWA violations.205 Because 
A.M. met the definition of an “Indian child,” ICWA 
applied.206 The Department of Social Services argued that 
the holding in Brackeen “render[ed] [the mother’s] 
complaints moot.”207 However, the court stated that 
Brackeen could still be appealed and that the Supreme Court 
had “upheld” ICWA in Holyfield; therefore, it addressed the 
case on its merits.208 
The placement preferences of ICWA would no longer 
apply, raising concerns that the “culture genocide” 
mentioned in the 1978 Congressional hearings would make 
a resurgence.209 Disproportionate numbers of Native 
American children are currently in foster care despite 
ICWA’s more stringent requirements for removal.210 This 
 
 203. See, e.g., In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 548 (Tex. 2003) (“The State’s 
fundamental interest in parental-rights termination cases is to protect the best 
interest of the child.”); In re Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299, 312 (1992) (“The key 
element in the court’s disposition is the best interest of the child.”). 
 204. In re A.M., 570 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. Ct. App. 2018). 
 205. Id. at 861, 863. 
 206. Id. at 863. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See id. Brackeen was indeed appealed. See supra note 169. 
 209. ICWA Hearing, supra note 1, at 2. 
 210. See, e.g., Disproportionality Table, NATIONAL INDIAN CHILD WELFARE 
ASSOCIATION, https://www.nicwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Disproportion 
ality-Table.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2019). Native American children as a whole 
are represented in foster care at approximately two-and-a-half times their 
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disproportionality would only increase if child welfare 
workers could adhere to a lower standard when removing 
children. With ICWA no longer good law, MEPA would apply 
instead. Native American children would be placed into 
foster and adoptive homes with no consideration given to 
their race or culture. Because the majority of adoptive 
parents are white, most of these children would be placed 
into white homes.211 This harkens back to boarding schools 
and the Indian Adoption Project, harms that ICWA sought 
to remedy. 
However, the effects would most likely extend beyond 
adoption cases. If the Fifth Circuit upholds that classification 
based on Native American descent is an impermissible racial 
classification, this will pave the way for other laws that use 
this classification to be declared unconstitutional as well 
using strict scrutiny. Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Morton v. Mancari that this classification is political rather 
than racial,212 considering the reasoning of the majority in 
Adoptive Couple, the possibility certainly exists that 
Mancari will be overturned, or that enough exceptions will 
be created that it is overturned in all but name. Based on the 
number of cases immediately following Adoptive Couple that 
seized on the opening left by the Supreme Court and 
attempted to widen it, as well as how quickly the plaintiff’s 
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arguments in A.M. relied on the holding in Brackeen, attacks 
on Mancari would likely come sooner rather than later. 
If this occurs, all federal statutes involving Native 
Americans could potentially be at risk.213 The “political 
classification” doctrine established in Mancari served as the 
basis for courts to defend “a broad array of legislation 
benefiting Indians and tribes against challenges by non-
Indians.”214 Such legislation includes tax exemptions for 
Native Americans that live on reservations,215 fishing 
rights,216 the ability of the federal government to take land 
into trust for Native American tribes,217 exclusive coal, 
mineral, and timber rights on reservations,218 and federal 
criminal jurisdiction over reservations.219 
Brackeen is a “prime candidate”220 to come before the 
Supreme Court. The recent appointment of Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court has heightened many 
ICWA advocates’ concerns that ICWA will be overturned.221 
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Kavanaugh replaced Justice Anthony Kennedy, a “key vote 
on important tribal issues.”222 Native American attorneys 
and leaders have accused Kavanaugh of not understanding 
why statutes regarding Native Americans exist.223 Prior to 
his appointment to the Supreme Court, Kavanaugh wrote an 
op-ed in support of the decision in Rice v. Cayetano, calling 
it, “one more step along the way in what I see as an inevitable 
conclusion within the next 10 to 20 years when the court says 
we are all one race in the eyes of government.”224 Concerned 
Native Americans fear that Kavanaugh’s “willing[ness] to 
split hairs regarding the rights and interests of Indigenous 
groups” based on whether or not those groups are 
“technically a federal Indian tribe does not bode well for how 
he would treat other Indigenous groups of people in this 
country.”225 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted ICWA as an attempt to prevent a 
continuance of the harms done to Native American children 
throughout the history of this country. An astounding 
number of Native American children lived in out-of-home 
placements before Congress passed ICWA. Native American 
children are overrepresented in foster care even with ICWA’s 
protection. If the Fifth Circuit en banc affirms the lower 
court’s decision that ICWA is unconstitutional, there is a 
genuine risk that these numbers will return to pre-ICWA 
levels. The only method that the court in Brackeen could 
have used to arrive at this result was to apply the wrong 
standard of review. Had it applied the correct standard, it 
would have been impossible for that court to reach the same 
result. The Fifth Circuit en banc will mostly likely apply the 
correct standard of review and issue the same holding as in 
its panel decision. If the court en banc instead affirms the 
district court’s decision, or if the case is granted certiorari by 
the Supreme Court and the decision is affirmed there, this 
country runs the risk of returning to the “cultural genocide” 
of the past.226 As the director of the Navajo Office of Resource 
Security stated during the ICWA confirmation hearings: 
 
Confirmation Hearings Reveal Deeply Troubling Views on Indian Law and Policy, 
DEMOCRATIC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.indian.senate.gov/news/press-
release/udall-kavanaugh-s-confirmation-hearings-reveal-deeply-troubling-views 
-indian-law. Senator Udall wrote that:  
From the documents I have reviewed so far, and based on information 
revealed during the hearings, I am convinced that Judge Kavanaugh is 
no friend to Indian Country. He openly characterized federal protections 
for Native Hawaiians as unconstitutional, and argued that “any racial 
group with creative reasoning can qualify as an Indian tribe.” He even 
questioned the constitutionality of programs dedicated specifically to 
Native Americans, a view that could upend decades of progress for 
Indian Country on everything from housing to government contracting. 
And considering the sheer number of documents that are still being 
shielded from public and Senate view, we may have only seen the tip of 
the iceberg when it comes to Judge Kavanaugh’s willful 
misunderstanding of the rights held by Native communities, including 
Alaska Native Villages. 
 226. See discussion supra Part III. 
280 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
“[t]he ultimate preservation and continuation of [Native 
American] cultures depends on our children and their proper 
growth and development.”227 
 
 
 227. ICWA Hearing, supra note 1, at 169 (statement of Bobby George, director 
of the Navajo Office of Resource Security). 
